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Introduction 
Over the last several years there has been a significant debate about the 
ethics of making active voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide available for terminally ill patients, including arguments for their 
moral adequacy. There is an increasing tendency to write in favor of 
accepting the morality of euthanasia in an effort to fit into public 
consensus. By "physician-assisted suicide" it is meant that the physician 
provides the means for a patient to end his or her life. By "active 
euthanasia" it is meant that the physician personally administers a lethal 
drug. Death will be caused to end a life of suffering, either because the 
patient does not want to continue living or because life has deteriorated to 
such a condition that it no longer can be considered dignified. 
Advancements in medicine have led to examination of the obligation 
to consider the use of all possible means of keeping a person ali ve, or if we 
are to do this when there is little chance of success. The issue has arisen of 
the question of a right to die with dignity. 
For some, this means to die without pain, through medical 
intervention or assisted suicide. Any death that is accompanied by 
suffering is considered undignified in today's mentality. Death can be 
caused by administration of a drug with the intention of ending life as well 
as ending suffering. Such active interventions are chosen when there is no 
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possibility of a cure and when the patient has expressed his desire not to 
continue living. 
For many others, the right to die with dignity implies the removal of 
life support systems or the withdrawal of treatment from terminally ill 
patients in order to allow the patient to succumb to the underlying disease. 
This frees the person from the slavery of aggressive medical treatment, 
which prolongs suffering. 
There has been a debate over the reach of the term "euthanasia" . In 
the past, that term has been divided into active and passive. Passive 
euthanasia means to hasten the death of a patient by removing life support 
equipment or stopping medical procedures or treatment. Active euthanasia 
means to immediately cause death by the application of a lethal agent. 
From the point of view of professional ethics, it is irrelevant whether the 
life of the patient was taken by an active intervention or by omission of a 
necessary treatment. Through both, death is brought about intentionally. 
The definition of euthanasia must be understood as, by action or 
omission, the deliberate ending of the life of a patient who is suffering or 
has an incurable disease, and this has been requested by either the patient 
or the family. I Here, omission is understood to be the privation of a 
medical intervention that is considered valid and necessary for the patient 
to live. 
On the other hand, there is no euthanasia in the removal of 
unnecessary life support, or in death caused by the "double effect" of drugs 
that are given to relieve suffering but may also shorten life, or refraining 
from medically futile treatment. There is no obligation to undergo or 
prolong a treatment that is considered futile by the medical profession. 
The practice of allowing death with palliative care interventions to relieve 
the terminally ill patient's pain, suffering and other symptoms is accepted 
as ethical and legal, provided the intention of the physician is to relieve 
pain and other symptoms, and not to hasten death .2 
Physicians are considered the logical candidates from whom to seek 
help in dying since many of the terminally ill see help in dying as an 
extension of relief from suffering and as a form of caring, consistent with 
the profession .3 Furthermore, it is already being done in countries like 
Holland. In addition, according to anonymous polls, 13 to 19% of 
physicians in the United States have participated in physician-assisted 
suicide.4 Oregon has been the first state to legalize physician-assisted 
suicide. 
In the present reflection I am going to analyze the arguments in favor 
of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide and consider a critical 
response from the Catholic Christian perspective for each of them, taking 
into account as well that there is also a rationale for the secular mind . 
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Reasons Given in Favor of Euthanasia and 
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Catholic Response 
1. Poor quality of life. Those who advocate euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide argue that in some circumstances living is worse than 
dying, that the pain and suffering caused by a terminal disease may make 
life so agonizing and unbearable that death may seem "an act of humanity" 
and physician-assisted suicide a way to die with dignity.5 The physician 
would act under the principle of beneficence to relieve the pain and 
suffering of terminally ill patients. For the dying patient, suffering may go 
far beyond pain. This includes: progressive loss of activity, mobility and 
freedom associated with increasing helplessness and dependence on 
others; physical discomforts such as nausea, vomiting, inability to swallow 
or to talk, incontinence and weakness ; fear of dying, loss of dignity ; and 
dementia.6 Life loses all quality and meaning so that death is preferable. 
Critical response: Quality of life issues are confused here with the 
value that the quality of life has. Human life has an intrinsic value.7 Good 
health cannot give dignity to human life, since health does not have life in 
itself, rather it participates in life. Health is a good that one can enjoy and 
care for, but it is not an absolute good to which everything else must be 
subordinated. Health is for the human being, but the human being is not for 
health. The dignity of the person cannot be erased by illness. Rather, loss 
of dignity is imputed to the patient by reactions of caregivers and family to 
the patient's plight or appearance. Furthermore, quality of life issues have 
a strong subjective component. Very easily the health care professional 
will substitute his or her quality of life standard for that of the patient. 
Dying with dignity must not be understood as a right to active 
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide when one is enduring a poor 
quality of life due to pain and suffering, rather it is a right to die in a 
dignified environment, receiving care and affection from persons to whom 
one is close, and the right not to prolong suffering with futile treatments. 
Suffering is not only caused by pain, there are many circumstances that 
cause suffering. The values, fears , and anxieties of the person must be 
attended to when death is near. 
2. Respect for the patient's autonomy. According to the defenders of 
euthanasia, respect for autonomous persons demands recognition of their 
right to decide how they will live their lives. This includes the dying 
process. It is proposed that we have the right to avoid intolerable suffering 
by exerting control over the way we die; we are free to take responsibility 
for our own life, including our death. Every person has an individual level 
of tolerance for suffering and therefore there is no objective measure of 
when life is unbearable that can apply to everyone. This is why it is 
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necessary that the patient exercise his/her autonomy. Some authors believe 
that there is a right to commit suicide and to have no unreasonable 
restrictions placed on the means by which one can exercise this right to 
suicide.8 States would not have the right to prevent a patient from the 
freedom to take his/her life. Battin has argued that there is an unequally 
distributed but fundamental right to suicide, which we have because it can 
be constitutive of human dignity, at least in a negative sense, when life 
becomes unbearable.9 This is even more relevant if we consider that, with 
adequate palliative care, there are cases in which it is not possible to avoid 
the suffering. lo The patient's right to self-determination has been a most 
central argument in favor of physician-assisted suicide. II Often it is 
assumed, without argument, that this implies a patient's right to request 
another agent to intervene so as to bring about his or her death. 12 A person 
who is terminally ill may not be able to exercise the option of suicide 
because of mental or physical limitations. In a way, they are being 
discriminated against because of their disability, since able-bodied people 
can exercise the option. It is also argued that future patients would be less 
anxious if they know of the possibility of physician-assisted suicide. 
Critical response: The terminally ill patient is in an extremely 
vulnerable position, suffering from depression, anxiety, fear, dejection, 
guilt, and diminished autonomy. Under these conditions, it is very difficult 
to have a clear mind to make decisions and the patient may almost blindly 
follow the suggestions of the physician. Asking for death does not 
necessaril y reflect an enduring, voluntary wish, properly reflected upon. 
The patient may wish death because of deficiencies in medical attention, 
such as not being able to alleviate pain, not because of a free decision . 
Further, it is not the same to commit suicide as to aid in a suicide. The 
latter is a form of homicide, even if the underlying reason is compassion. 
The autonomy of the patient cannot oven-ide the physician 's autonomy. 13 
The patient has no right to ask another person to help in suicide. 
3. The principle of beneficence. The principle of beneficence, or 
compassion for the suffering has been used as an argument in favor of 
euthanasia. 14 In this way, euthanasia has been considered a virtuous act. 
Nonabandonment of the patient has been part of the traditional care by 
physicians. Physician-assisted suicide must be judged under this ethical 
principle. IS Today, many terminally ill patients consider physicians the 
logical ones to help them in dying since, for these patients, assisting death 
is considered an extension of alleviating suffering and exercise of care, 
consistent with the profession. 16 
Critical response: The compassion talked about by the proponents 
of euthanasia reflects a distorted view. True compassion does not eliminate 
the sufferer, but seeks to relieve the cause of the suffering. 17 Otherwise, the 
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life of the patient is devalued. Besides, compassion is a spiritual quality, 
which means "suffering with," to be present to the sufferer, it is not a 
principle or self-justifying reason. Choosing assisted suicide eliminates all 
possible bonding with those who accompany one in the difficult moments 
of death. Further, to bring about death by euthanasia is not within the 
competence of the medical profession. Physician-assisted suicide is not 
consistent with the doctor's pledge to heal and treat, is against the 
traditional ethical codes (Hippocratic, World Health Association, AMA). 
It will lead to a distrust in physicians. Accepting assisted suicide will 
diminish the peoples ' trust in physicians. Moreover, the health 
professional also has an autonomy that must be respected and he/she 
cannot be pressed to act against his/her professional values. 
4. The positive experience of acceptance of euthanasia in Holland. The 
experiment of euthanasia in Holland is regarded as successful by the 
general public and the medical profession in that country, so that no 
physician who follows the given guidelines can be penalized. These 
guidelines are: the patient must be competent and ask voluntarily for death 
after having been counseled, his/her suffering must be unbearable not 
possible to ameliorate, the judgment of the physician with respect to 
diagnosis and prognosis must be confirmed by another physician. 
Critical response: The experience in the Netherlands has shown the 
reality of the slippery slope. There have been successive steps in 
relaxation of criteria: euthanasia has been extended to non-terminal 
patients, minors, Down Syndrome, patients with mental suffering, severe 
depression, dementia, incompetence "under certain conditions, and non-
terminal AIDS patients. IS This evil reality exceeds the positive effect that 
could be claimed for legalized euthanasia.19 
5. Diminishing of the public stigma against suicide. The public stigma 
against suicide is decreasing. In most jurisdictions, suicide is a legal act 
and has been so for decades. Most suicides are seen as resulting from 
temporary mental illness, usually depression,20 but the reason why 
terminally ill patients desire to shorten the process of dying is to terminate 
their suffering. This raises the concept of rational suicide. 
Critical response: Suicide is still considered an evil in today's 
society and when it is known that someone is attempting suicide, measures 
are taken to prevent it. Data suggest that the interest of patients in 
euthanasia in the majority of cases is due to depression or psychological 
distress, rather than pain. This suggests that much of the debate about 
euthanasia is misplaced, since it focuses on pain and using euthanasia for 
pain relief when, in fact, pain does not seem to be the primary motive.21 
Suffering of psychological origin can be relieved with adequate counseling 
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and psychiatric intervention. With proper support, including pain relief, 
psychological and spiritual therapy, and friendship, the patient can die in a 
dignified way as a member of the human family, without any euthanasia. 
No present legislation allows help in committing suicide for a person who 
is going through a period of depression. Rather, his/her depression would 
be treated. To legalize physician-assisted suicide would contribute to 
desensitization toward killing throughout society. Though attempting 
suicide has lately been decriminalized, the state's interest in preventing it, 
including the penalization of those who aid the attempt, has not wavered. 
No matter how ill a person , he is still among the living and therefore has 
the right to liveY Moreover, because life does not belong completely to 
us , we simply do not have a right to commit suicide. No one can say that 
he/she has given life to himself/herself. Not all ultimate choices about 
one's life qualify as protected rights. 
6. The similarity between killing and letting die. The distinction 
between "passive" and "active" euthanasia has been criticized for 
depending on problematic conceptions of causation and on the belief that 
the sheer difference between killing and letting die is morally irrelevant. 
Discontinuing life support measures and active voluntary euthanasia are 
similar from the patient 's point of view in that the fundamental desire is for 
an earlier and more comfortable death. They are similar morally in that 
both are done with the intent of ending life. 23 It is argued that the intention 
is morally irrelevant in the evaluation of the morality of the action . For 
example, in the case of stopping feeding artificially a patient in coma, 
clearly the intention is to end life, since the person would die of hunger. In 
the case of discontinuing supportive measures and allowing the patient to 
die after days or weeks of extreme discomfort, active euthanasia is 
sometimes deemed morally preferable. 24 For some, discontinuing a 
ventilator cannot be considered a refusal of treatment, rather it is a request 
to be killed ."S For Patrick Hopkins,26 there is no metaphysical, essential 
and intrinsic moral difference between machines and body organs so that 
omitting treatment is a form of killing in which we deprive the person of an 
organ that can only function with the aid of a machine or technology. He 
feels that we need to set aside our prejudices against the artificial and 
extend the option of good killing (active euthanasia) to those who are 
trapped by nature. If our society recognizes that life can be sufficiently 
burdensome while on life-sustaining treatments, such as a respirator or 
dialysis machine, and further that these interventions can be withdrawn or 
withheld (what some call passive euthanasia), then it can be sufficiently 
burdensome to justify active euthanasia. 
Critical response: There is a special relationship between the 
physician and the patient. An omission to act, if it results in harm, may 
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bring legal liability. If a competent patient refuses to consent to treatment 
or to continue treatment, the legal effect is that the physician is absolved of 
his or her duty by the patient. Although the physician terminates treatment, 
the subsequent death is caused by the underlying disease, which the 
physician no longer has authority to treat. The physician is not killing the 
patient but allowing him to die. Ordinarily no one is under any duty to help 
a neighbor, such that omissions to act bring no liabilityY Voluntary 
acceptance of a death that medical intervention can only postpone cannot 
be forbidden. 
What is forbidden is unlawful killing. Often in the dialogue, there is 
confusion between passive euthanasia and euthanasia by omission. The 
latter brings legal liability but the former does not since natural deaths are 
not killing. Thus, they are neither illegal nor immoral, and do not confer 
responsibility. It will prove helpful to avoid the term passive euthanasia, 
while we can retain the idea of euthanasia by omission, which implies a 
negligent act. 
A conclusion about causation simply reflects a judgment about the 
right place to assign responsibility. When a person turns off a life-
supporting respirator without authorization, it is clear that he/she is causing 
the patient's death and is subject to liability, but when a physician follows 
the patient's directions to disconnect a respirator, he has not acted 
wrongfully. He has no duty to continue treatment against the patient's 
wishes, even though his action is causally related to the patient's death. 
Furthermore, the right to avoid treatment is based on the right to resist 
physical invasions that are not proportionate to the cost to the patient, not 
in the right to accelerate death, which does not exist. 
Withdrawal or withholding treatment is accepted in such cases as: 
continuation of mechanical ventilation after whole brain death, therapy in 
cases of irreversible coma (except ordinary care), life support mechanisms 
in cases of terminally ill patients, resuscitating techniques in cases 
considered futile by the medical profession, medically futile therapies that 
increase pain, and therapies clearly disproportionate in relation to human 
costs and utility for the patient.28 
An illustration that intention has its place in moral life is that when the 
person does not die after removal of the treatment, the person is left alive. 
This is not satisfied by assisted suicide. It is one thing to desire death and 
actively bring this about and another thing to desire death and allow it to 
occur. It is one thing to respect the will of the patient to reject treatment 
and another to take his life. It is not just a psychological difference, but 
also a moral one. To kill is always a lesion of the principle of non-
maleficence, but to allow death is not, under certain conditions. To allow 
someone to die of a disease for which we are not responsible and cannot 
cure is to allow the disease to be the cause of the death.29 The intention of 
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allowing to die is compassion, not death, while the intention of active 
euthanasia is death as a means for compassion. 30 It does not maintain the 
dignity of the patient to continue futile treatments when there are no 
possibilities of cure. A futile treatment does not produce a benefit to the 
patient, but a harm.31 It is not the same to maintain life in someone who is 
living as it is to as to prevent death in someone who is dying. 
A treatment is considered futile if it does no more than maintain 
unconsciousness or if it does not permit an end to dependency on the 
intensive care unit. Quantitatively, a physician can consider a treatment 
futile when empirical data demonstrate less than 1 % probability of benefit 
to the patientY Life and death issues cannot be decided with absolute 
certainty, simply because there is no strict and specific relation between the 
etiology and the di sease. Our knowledge of an empirical reality is always 
approximate, probable. We cannot ask the physician for absolute certitude 
in his/her decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to establi sh a prudent limit 
of error for life and death decisions. Since there is no absolute certainty, it 
is the deci sion of the patient to continue with a futile treatment. For an act 
of omission to be euthanasia, the treatment omitted or withdrawn must be 
a useful one, not a futile one. 
7. The principle of double effect is a form of active euthanasia. 
Physicians are allowed to give increasing doses of narcotics when there is 
severe pain. It is presumed they do thi s with the knowledge that these 
drugs depress respiration and could hasten death.33 It is argued that if the 
death of the person who wishes to die is not an evil for himselflherself, 
then the doctrine of double effect does not have relevance in allowing 
voluntary euthanasia. 
Critical response: Optimal palliative care could provide adequate 
pain relieffor most tenninally ill patients.3.J Inpatient hospice units provide 
an example of providing supportive measures at the end of life, with 
comfort care directed to the person as a whole. Legalizing physician-
ass isted suicide would divert attention from pain relief and palliative care. 
The easy road for the health care professional is to be free from the 
frustration, hostility and anguish that cause the "hopeless" cases. The issue 
of hastening death with palliative care interventions for terminally ill 
patients is accepted as ethical and legal provided the intention of the 
physician is to relieve pain and other symptoms and not to hasten death .35 
Physicians, though, must be careful not to introduce narcotics in a big 
dosage all at once, without giving the patient time to develop tolerance. A 
disproportionate sedation can cause interruption of feeding and hydration 
of the patient, who can die of hunger or thirst while unconscious or even of 
an overdose. In such cases, euthanasia can be concealed. Ethically, the 
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physician must look for the pain relief that will offer less risk to shorten life 
and still relieve the patient from unnecessary suffering. 
8. The duty of not imposing heavy burdens on those close to us. John 
Hardwig has argued that when modern medicine allows us to survive far 
longer than we can take care of ourselves, there is a duty or responsibility 
to die, out of consideration for our loved ones not to impose crushing 
burdens on them. 36 In a time when medical funding is restricted, it may not 
be ethical to engage in extremely expensive treatment of terminally ill 
people. David Thomasma argues that it could be ethical to ask for 
physician-assisted suicide or active euthanasia because of love for close 
relatives, consideling that in Christian doctrine there are instances in which 
killing is justified and also considering that such a request could be 
considered acceptance of the cross, or the acceptance of death as the 
martyrs had done, since having been able to avoid death, they accepted it 
instead, donating their lives for others.37 
Critical response: To allow physician-assisted suicide would have 
an impact on other sufferers who are ill, aged, or weak. This will devalue 
their lives and they may undergo assisted suicide under pressure. Further 
pressure is exerted by economic constraints, but mentioning this to the 
patient undermines the call to generosity of those who surround the patient, 
who is suffering enough already with the disease. Terminally ill patients 
would lose the bonds with those who accompany them in the last moments 
of life, they would have to justify their decision to keep on living. To help 
discover, through suffering, the meaning of the entirety of life can liberate 
the patient from feelings of abandonment and desperation when facing 
death . 
Furthermore, the voluntary acceptance of death by Christ and the 
martyrs can not be interpreted as equivalent to suicide.38 As has been 
pointed out by Engelhardt,39 Christ has taught us that life has as a goal 
union with God and His cross is a way to offer His life to God. Suicide, 
instead, is an act in which the person turns against himselflherself, wishing 
death without pursuing union. The martyrs never accepted death under the 
premise of refusing to be a burden to themselves or their loved ones. To 
the contrary, they accepted with humility the indignity and suffering of 
death because of a superior cause, the union with God. This has nothing to 
do with active euthanasia or assisted suicide. 
Ethical Reflection 
Practically all religious traditions, including groups such as Christians, 
Muslims, and Jews, consider life as a gift from God, to be given and taken 
at the time of His choosing; suicide can never be an option. Aristotle 
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affirmed40 that suicide is an unjust act and cannot be allowed, not because 
it goes against the individual , but because it goes against the community. 
Human life has value and dignity in itself because it is the life of a person. 
Physical life is constitutive of the person and a condition for its existence, 
is the fundamental value of the person and therefore cannot be valued, taking 
as criteria minor and relative values, nor can be declared to the disposition 
of others. Besides, Chlistians believe that God supports people in suffering 
and therefore to actively end one's life would represent a lack of trust in 
God 's promise.41 Taking life usurps the prerogative that God has over each 
one of our lives. Also, as Chlistians, we have an obligation to SUppOlt those 
who are suffering and to maintain our belief that suffering brings us closer 
to Christ, identifying us with His cross and participating in redemption. 
Part of the problem with much of the present debate on euthanasia is 
that no value is given to suffering, although it could be an occasion for a 
person to look deeply into hi s/her own existence, to look for reconciliation 
and find a transcendental meaning to life. Nowadays people have very 
little tolerance for pain , we are afraid of it. This fear is due to an excessive 
preoccupation with the body and to technical progress . In these, thanks to 
alleviation of pain by drugs and anesthesia, we are today much less 
familiar with pain than our predecessors were. It has gotten to the point 
that death is accepted more than pain. This rejection of suffering has led to 
the social acceptance of euthanasia. 
But suffering can lead to a spilitual experience and it is possible to 
find meaning in life when there is no hope of cure.42 Spirituality can fortify 
a person who suffers and help him accept hi s condition. Finding meaning 
to suffering gives sense to a suffering life that has little capacity for 
relationships. Even considering that life can become unbearable, the final 
matter is that life cannot be taken because suicide is not ethical. 
The question can be raised as to whether believers have the right to 
take these beliefs and impose them on the entire populations, including 
secularists, atheists, and agnostics. I will argue that they do in this case, 
si nce it is possible to find a rational solution. Both believers and non-
believers agree with the common conception that life and death are given 
to us. The only difference is that believers attribute this gift of life to God. 
Not everything, then, is autonomous in the human being. We do not give 
life to ourselves, we have received it from our parents. Therefore, we do 
not have absolute dominion over our own lives and cannot take them. 
This argument reinforces all the clitical arguments against euthanasia, 
since the quality of life cannot have greater value than life itself. The 
autonomy of the person cannot be absolute, true compassion cannot consist 
in eliminating the sufferer, suffering cannot be enough argument to accept 
suicide, to allow to die is in the context of accepting death as a part of life. 
and to alleviate pain and suffering is to help life. To treat the body as if it 
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were an object that could be freely destroyed violates the intrinsic dignity 
of the person. We have the responsibility and the duty to take care of each 
other until the natural end of our lives. We have received our lives, they are 
not objects that we possess. Rather, we are responsible for what we do 
with them. We are able to exercise options and it is this that makes us 
responsible for our li ves. 
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